what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes; and how it
ought to be kept。
Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the
conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and
wished to retain them。 Nor is there any miracle in this; but much that
is reasonable and quite natural。 And on these matters I spoke at Nantes
with Rouen; when Valentino; '1' as Cesare Borgia; the son of Pope
Alexander; was usually called; occupied the Romagna; and on Cardinal
Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war; I
replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft; meaning
that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such
greatness。 And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the Church
and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France; and her ruin may be
attributed to them。 From this a general rule is drawn which never or
rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another being powerful is
ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about either by
astuteness or else by force; and both are distrusted by him who has been
raised to power。
1。 So called in Italian from the duchy of Valentinois; conferred
on him by Louis XII。
CHAPTER IV
WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS; CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER; DID NOT REBEL AGAINST
THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH
CONSIDERING the difficulties which men have had to hold a newly acquired
state; some might wonder how; seeing that Alexander the Great became the
master of Asia in a few years; and died whilst it was yet scarcely
settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire would
have rebelled); nevertheless his successors maintained themselves; and
had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose among themselves
from their own ambitions。
I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to be
governed in two different ways: either by a prince; with a body of
servants; who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his
favour and permission; or by a prince and barons; who hold that dignity
by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince。 Such barons
have states and their own subjects; who recognize them as lords and hold
them in natural affection。 Those states that are governed by a prince
and his servants hold their prince in more consideration; because in all
the country there is no one who is recognized as superior to him; and if
they yield obedience to another they do it as to a minister and
official; and they do not bear him any particular affection。
The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the
King of France。 The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord;
the others are his servants; and; dividing his kingdom into sanjaks; he
sends there different administrators; and shifts and changes them as he
chooses。 But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient
body of lords; acknowledged by their own subjects; and beloved by them;
they have their own prerogatives; nor can the king take these away
except at his peril。 Therefore; he who considers both of these states
will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk; but;
once it is conquered; great ease in holding it。 The causes of the
difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that the usurper
cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom; nor can he hope to be
assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the lord has around
him。 This arises from the reasons given above; for his ministers; being
all slaves and bondmen; can only be corrupted with great difficulty; and
one can expect little advantage from them when they have been corrupted;
as they cannot carry the people with them; for the reasons assigned。
Hence; he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him
united; and he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the
revolt of others; but; if once the Turk has been conquered; and routed
in the field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies; there is
nothing to fear but the family of the prince; and; this being
exterminated; there remains no one to fear; the others having no credit
with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them before his
victory; so he ought not to fear them after it。
The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France; because
one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom;
for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change。 Such men;
for the reasons given; can open the way into the state and render the
victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards; you meet with
infinite difficulties; both from those who have assisted you and from
those you have crushed。 Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated
the family of the prince; because the lords that remain make themselves
the heads of fresh movements against you; and as you are unable either
to satisfy or exterminate them; that state is lost whenever time brings
the opportunity。
Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of
Darius; you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk; and
therefore it was only necessary for Alexander; first to overthrow him in
the field; and then to take the country from him。 After which victory;
Darius being killed; the state remained secure to Alexander; for the
above reasons。 And if his successors had been united they would have
enjoyed it securely and at their ease; for there were no tumults raised
in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves。
But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted
like that of France。 Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the
Romans in Spain; France; and Greece; owing to the many principalities
there were in these states; of which; as long as the memory of them
endured; the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the
power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed away;
and the Romans then became secure possessors。 And when fighting
afterwards amongst themselves; each one was able to attach to himself
his own parts of the country; according to the authority he had assumed
there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated; none other
than the Romans were acknowledged。
When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with
which Alexander held the Empire of Asia; or at the difficulties which
others have had to keep an acquisition; such as Pyrrhus and many more;
this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the
conqueror; but by the want of uniformity in the subject state。
CHAPTER V
CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER
THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED
WHENEVER those states which have been acquired as stated have been
accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom; there are three
courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them; the
next is to reside there in person; the third is to permit them to live
under their own laws; drawing a tribute; and establishing within it an
oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you。 Because such a government;
being created by the prince; knows that it cannot stand without his
friendship and interest; and does its utmost to support him; and
therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it
more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other way。
There are; for example; the Spartans and the Romans。 The Spartans held
Athens and Thebes; establishing there an oligarchy; nevertheless they
lost them。 The Romans; in order to hold Capua; Carthage; and Numantia;
dismantled them; and did not lose them。 They wished to hold Greece as
the Spartans held it; making it free and permitting its laws; and did
not succeed。 So to hold it they were pelled to dismantle many cities
in the country; for in truth there is no safe way to retain them
otherwise than by ruining them。 And he who bees master of a city
accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it; may expect to be
destroyed by it; for in rebellion it has always the watch…word of
liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point; which neither
time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget。 And what ever you may do
or provide against; they never forget that name or their privileges
unless they are disunited or dispersed but at every chance they
immediately rally to them; as Pisa after the hundred years she had been
held in bondage by the Florentines。
But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince; and
his family is exterminated; they; being on the one hand accustomed to
obey and on the other hand not having the old prince; cannot agree in
making one from amongst themselves; and they do not know how to govern
themselves。 For this reason they
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