《马基雅维里 君主论英文prince》

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马基雅维里 君主论英文prince- 第3部分


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what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes; and how it

ought to be kept。



Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the

conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and

wished to retain them。 Nor is there any miracle in this; but much that

is reasonable and quite natural。 And on these matters I spoke at Nantes

with Rouen; when Valentino; '1' as Cesare Borgia; the son of Pope

Alexander; was usually called; occupied the Romagna; and on Cardinal

Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war; I

replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft; meaning

that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such

greatness。 And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the Church

and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France; and her ruin may be

attributed to them。 From this a general rule is drawn which never or

rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another being powerful is

ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about either by

astuteness or else by force; and both are distrusted by him who has been

raised to power。



1。 So called  in Italian  from the duchy of Valentinois; conferred

on him by Louis XII。



CHAPTER IV



WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS; CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER; DID NOT REBEL AGAINST

THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH



CONSIDERING the difficulties which men have had to hold a newly acquired

state; some might wonder how; seeing that Alexander the Great became the

master of Asia in a few years; and died whilst it was yet scarcely

settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire would

have rebelled); nevertheless his successors maintained themselves; and

had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose among themselves

from their own ambitions。



I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to be

governed in two different ways: either by a prince; with a body of

servants; who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his

favour and permission; or by a prince and barons; who hold that dignity

by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince。 Such barons

have states and their own subjects; who recognize them as lords and hold

them in natural affection。 Those states that are governed by a prince

and his servants hold their prince in more consideration; because in all

the country there is no one who is recognized as superior to him; and if

they yield obedience to another they do it as to a minister and

official; and they do not bear him any particular affection。



The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the

King of France。 The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord;

the others are his servants; and; dividing his kingdom into sanjaks; he

sends there different administrators; and shifts and changes them as he

chooses。 But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient

body of lords; acknowledged by their own subjects; and beloved by them;

they have their own prerogatives; nor can the king take these away

except at his peril。 Therefore; he who considers both of these states

will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk; but;

once it is conquered; great ease in holding it。 The causes of the

difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that the usurper

cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom; nor can he hope to be

assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the lord has around

him。 This arises from the reasons given above; for his ministers; being

all slaves and bondmen; can only be corrupted with great difficulty; and

one can expect little advantage from them when they have been corrupted;

as they cannot carry the people with them; for the reasons assigned。

Hence; he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him

united; and he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the

revolt of others; but; if once the Turk has been conquered; and routed

in the field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies; there is

nothing to fear but the family of the prince; and; this being

exterminated; there remains no one to fear; the others having no credit

with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them before his

victory; so he ought not to fear them after it。



The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France; because

one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom;

for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change。 Such men;

for the reasons given; can open the way into the state and render the

victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards; you meet with

infinite difficulties; both from those who have assisted you and from

those you have crushed。 Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated

the family of the prince; because the lords that remain make themselves

the heads of fresh movements against you; and as you are unable either

to satisfy or exterminate them; that state is lost whenever time brings

the opportunity。



Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of

Darius; you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk; and

therefore it was only necessary for Alexander; first to overthrow him in

the field; and then to take the country from him。 After which victory;

Darius being killed; the state remained secure to Alexander; for the

above reasons。 And if his successors had been united they would have

enjoyed it securely and at their ease; for there were no tumults raised

in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves。



But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted

like that of France。 Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the

Romans in Spain; France; and Greece; owing to the many principalities

there were in these states; of which; as long as the memory of them

endured; the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the

power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed away;

and the Romans then became secure possessors。 And when fighting

afterwards amongst themselves; each one was able to attach to himself

his own parts of the country; according to the authority he had assumed

there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated; none other

than the Romans were acknowledged。



When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with

which Alexander held the Empire of Asia; or at the difficulties which

others have had to keep an acquisition; such as Pyrrhus and many more;

this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the

conqueror; but by the want of uniformity in the subject state。



CHAPTER V



CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER

THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED



WHENEVER those states which have been acquired as stated have been

accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom; there are three

courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them; the

next is to reside there in person; the third is to permit them to live

under their own laws; drawing a tribute; and establishing within it an

oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you。 Because such a government;

being created by the prince; knows that it cannot stand without his

friendship and interest; and does its utmost to support him; and

therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it

more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other way。



There are; for example; the Spartans and the Romans。 The Spartans held

Athens and Thebes; establishing there an oligarchy; nevertheless they

lost them。 The Romans; in order to hold Capua; Carthage; and Numantia;

dismantled them; and did not lose them。 They wished to hold Greece as

the Spartans held it; making it free and permitting its laws; and did

not succeed。 So to hold it they were pelled to dismantle many cities

in the country; for in truth there is no safe way to retain them

otherwise than by ruining them。 And he who bees master of a city

accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it; may expect to be

destroyed by it; for in rebellion it has always the watch…word of

liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point; which neither

time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget。 And what ever you may do

or provide against; they never forget that name or their privileges

unless they are disunited or dispersed but at every chance they

immediately rally to them; as Pisa after the hundred years she had been

held in bondage by the Florentines。



But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince; and

his family is exterminated; they; being on the one hand accustomed to

obey and on the other hand not having the old prince; cannot agree in

making one from amongst themselves; and they do not know how to govern

themselves。 For this reason they
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