《马基雅维里 君主论英文prince》

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马基雅维里 君主论英文prince- 第18部分


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was in the second; for whenever one has judgment to know good or bad

when it is said and done; although he himself may not have the

initiative; yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his servant;

and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the servant cannot

hope to deceive him; and is kept honest。



But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one

test which never falls; when you see the servant thinking more of his

own interests than of yours; and seeking inwardly his own profit in

everything; such a man will never make a good servant; nor will you ever

be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in his

hands ought never to think of himself; but always of his prince; and

never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not concerned。



On the other to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study him;

honouring him; enriching him; doing him kindnesses; sharing with him the

honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he cannot stand

alone; so that many honours not make him desire more; many riches make

him wish for more; and that many cares may make him dread changes。 When;

therefore; servants; and princes towards servants; are thus disposed;

they can trust each other; but when it is otherwise; the end will always

be disastrous for either one or the other。



CHAPTER XXIII



HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED



I DO NOT wish to leave out an important branch of this subject; for it

is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved; unless

they are very careful and discriminating。 It is that of flatterers; of

whom courts arc full; because men are so self…placent in their own

affairs; and in a way so deceived in them; that they are preserved with

difficulty from this pest; and if they wish to defend themselves they

run the danger of falling into contempt。 Because there is no other way

of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that

to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell

you the truth; respect for you abates。



Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the

wise men in his state; and giving to them only the liberty of speaking

the truth to him; and then only of those things of which he inquires;

and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything; and

listen to their opinions; and afterwards form his own conclusions。 With

these councillors; separately and collectively; he ought to carry

himself in such a way that each of them should know that; the more

freely he shall speak; the more he shall be preferred; outside of these;

he should listen to no one; pursue the thing resolved on; and be

steadfast in his resolutions。 He who does otherwise is either overthrown

by flatterers; or is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls

into contempt。



I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example。 Fra Luca; the man of

affairs to Maximilian; the present emperor; speaking of his majesty;

said: He consulted with no one; yet never got his own way in anything。

This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the

above; for the emperor is a secretive man  he does not municate his

designs to any one; nor does he receive opinions on them。 But as in

carrying them into effect they bee revealed and known; they are at

once obstructed by those men whom he has around him; and he; being

pliant; is diverted from them。 Hence it follows that those things he

does one day he undoes the next; and no one ever understands what he

wishes or intends to do; and no one can rely on his resolutions。



A prince; therefore; ought always to take counsel; but only when he

wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one

from offering advice unless he asks it; but; however; he ought to be a

constant inquirer; and afterwards a patient listener concerning the

things of which he inquired; also; on learning that any one; on any

consideration; has not told him the truth; he should let his anger be

felt。



And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression

of his wisdom is not so through his own ability; but through the good

advisers that he has around him; beyond doubt they are deceived; because

this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not wise

himself will never take good advice; unless by chance he has yielded his

affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man。 In

this case indeed he may be well governed; but it would not be for long;

because such a governor would in a short time take away his state from

him。



But if a prince who is not experienced should take counsel from more

than one he will never get united counsels; nor will he know how to

unite them。 Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests; and

the prince will not know how to control them or to see through them。 And

they are not to be found otherwise; because men will always prove untrue

to you unless they are kept honest by constraint。 Therefore it must be

inferred that good counsels; whencesoever they e; are born of the

wisdom of the prince; and not the wisdom of the prince from good

counsels。



CHAPTER XXIV



THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES



THE previous suggestions; carefully observed; will enable a new prince

to appear well established; and render him at once more secure and fixed

in the state than if he had been long seated there。 For the actions of a

new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary one;

and when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind far

tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more by the

present than by the past; and when they find the present good they enjoy

it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost defence for a

prince if he fails them not in other things。 Thus it will be a double

glory to him to have established a new principality; and adorned and

strengthened it with good laws; good arms; good allies; and with a good

example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who; born a prince;

shall lose his state by want of wisdom。



And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in

Italy in our times; such as the King of Naples; the Duke of Milan; and

others; there will be found in them; firstly; one mon defect in

regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in

the next place; some one of them will be seen; either to have had the

people hostile; or if he has had the people friendly; he has not known

how to secure the nobles。 In the absence of these defects states that

have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost。



Philip of Macedon; not the father of Alexander the Great; but he who was

conquered by Titus Quintius; had not much territory pared to the

greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him; yet being a

warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles; he

sustained the war against his enemies for many years; and if in the end

he lost the dominion of some cities; nevertheless he retained the

kingdom。



Therefore; do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their

principalities after so many years' possession; but rather their own

sloth; because in quiet times they never thought there could be a change

(it is a mon defect in man not to make any provision in the calm

against the tempest); and when afterwards the bad times came they

thought of flight and not of defending themselves; and they hoped that

the people; disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors; would recall

them。 This course; when others fail; may be good; but it is very bad to

have neglected all other expedients for that; since you would never wish

to fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later on to

restore you。 This again either does not happen; or; if it does; it will

not be for your security; because that deliverance is of no avail which

does not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable; certain; and

durable that depend on yourself and your valour。



CHAPTER XXV



WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS; AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER



IT is not unknown to me how many men have had; and still have; the

opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by

fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and

that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us

believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs; but to let

chance govern them。 This opinion has been more credited in our times

because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen; and may

still be seen; every day; beyond all human conjecture。 Sometimes

pondering over this; I am in some degree inclined to their opinion。

Nevertheless; not to extinguish our free will; I hold it to be true that

Fortune is 
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