《马基雅维里 君主论英文prince》

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马基雅维里 君主论英文prince- 第14部分


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and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for;

provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by his

people; he can only be attacked with difficulty。 For this reason a

prince ought to have two fears; one from within; on account of his

subjects; the other from without; on account of external powers。 From

the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies;

and if he is well armed he will have good friends; and affairs will

always remain quiet within when they are quiet without; unless they

should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should

affairs outside be disturbed; if he has carried out his preparations and

has lived as I have said; as long as he does not despair; he will resist

every attack; as I said Nabis the Spartan did。



But concerning his subjects; when affairs outside are disturbed he has

only to fear that they will conspire secretly; from which a prince can

easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised; and by

keeping the people satisfied with him; which it is most necessary for

him to acplish; as I said above at length。 And one of the most

efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not

to be hated and despised by the people; for he who conspires against a

prince always expects to please them by his removal; but when the

conspirator can only look forward to offending them; he will not have

the courage to take such a course; for the difficulties that confront a

conspirator are infinite。 And as experience shows; many have been the

conspiracies; but few have been successful; because he who conspires

cannot act alone; nor can he take a panion except from those whom he

believes to be malcontents; and as soon as you have opened your mind to

a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content

himself; for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so that;

seeing the gain from this course to be assured; and seeing the other to

be doubtful and full of dangers; he must be a very rare friend; or a

thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince; to keep faith with you。



And; to reduce the matter into a small pass; I say that; on the side

of the conspirator; there is nothing but fear; jealousy; prospect of

punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the

majesty of the principality; the laws; the protection of friends and the

state to defend him; so that; adding to all these things the popular

goodwill; it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to

conspire。 For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the

execution of his plot; in this case he has also to fear the sequel to

the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy; and

thus cannot hope for any escape。



Endless examples could be given on this subject; but I will be content

with one; brought to pass within the memory of our fathers。 Messer

Annibale Bentivoglio; who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the

present Annibale); having been murdered by the Canneschi; who had

conspired against him; not one of his family survived but Messer

Giovanni; who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination the

people rose and murdered all the Canneschi。 This sprung from the popular

goodwill which the house of Bentivoglio enjoyed in those days in

Bologna; which was so great that; although none remained there after the

death of Annibale who were able to rule the state; the Bolognese; having

information that there was one of the Bentivoglio family in Florence;

who up to that time had been considered the son of a blacksmith; sent to

Florence for him and gave him the government of their city; and it was

ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due course to the government。



For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies of

little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is

hostile to him; and bears hatred towards him; he ought to fear

everything and everybody。 And well…ordered states and wise princes have

taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation; and to keep the

people satisfied and contented; for this is one of the most important

objects a prince can have。



Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France; and

in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty and

security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its

authority; because he who founded the kingdom; knowing the ambition of

the nobility and their boldness; considered that a bit in their mouths

would be necessary to hold them in; and; on the other side; knowing the

hatred of the people; founded in fear; against the nobles; he wished to

protect them; yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care

of the king; therefore; to take away the reproach which he would be

liable to from the nobles for favouring the people; and from the people

for favouring the nobles; he set up an arbiter; who should be one who

could beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the

king。 Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement; or

a greater source of security to the king and kingdom。 From this one can

draw another important conclusion; that princes ought to leave affairs

of reproach to the management of others; and keep those of grace in

their own hands。 And further; I consider that a prince ought to cherish

the nobles; but not so as to make himself hated by the people。



It may appear; perhaps; to some who have examined the lives and deaths

of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to

my opinion; seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great

qualities of soul; nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been

killed by subjects who have conspired against them。 Wishing; therefore;

to answer these objections; I will recall the characters of some of the

emperors; and will show that the causes of their ruin were not different

to those alleged by me; at the same time I will only submit for

consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who studies the

affairs of those times。



It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to

the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were

Marcus and his son modus; Pertinax; Julian; Severus and his son

Antoninus Caracalla; Macrinus; Heliogabalus; Alexander; and Maximinus。



There is first to note that; whereas in other principalities the

ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be

contended with; the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to

put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers; a matter so beset

with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard thing

to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the people

loved peace; and for this reason they loved the unaspiring prince;

whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold; cruel; and

rapacious; which qualities they were quite willing he should exercise

upon the people; so that they could get double pay and give vent to

their greed and cruelty。 Hence it arose that those emperors were always

overthrown who; either by birth or training; had no great authority; and

most of them; especially those who came new to the principality;

recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours; were inclined

to give satisfaction to the soldiers; caring little about injuring the

people。 Which course was necessary; because; as princes cannot help

being hated by someone; they ought; in the first place; to avoid being

hated by every one; and when they cannot pass this; they ought to

endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the most

powerful。 Therefore; those emperors who through inexperience had need of

special favour adhered more readily to the soldiers than to the people;

a course which turned out advantageous to them or not; accordingly as

the prince knew how to maintain authority over them。



From these causes it arose that Marcus 'Aurelius'; Pertinax; and

Alexander; being all men of modest life; lovers of justice; enemies to

cruelty; humane; and benignant; came to a sad end except Marcus; he

alone lived and died honoured; because he had succeeded to the throne by

hereditary title; and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people;

and afterwards; being possessed of many virtues which made him

respected; he always kept both orders in their places whilst he lived;

and was neither hated nor despised。



But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers;

who; being accustomed to live licentiously under modus; could not

endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus;

having given cause for hatred; to which hatred there was added contempt

for his old age; he was overthrown at the very beginning of his

administration。 And
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